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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD CUNNINGHAM, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
V. Case No. 20638 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Can appellant show, solely upon the record before this 
Court, that the lower court erred in granting respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action for alleged medical malpractice arising 
from the performance of a surgical procedure upon plaintiff 
Ronald Cunningham by Dr. Michael H. Stevens at the University 
of Utah Hospital on January 28, 1982. Plaintiff claims that 
Dr. Stevens was negligent in his medical treatment of plain-
tiff, that his negligence caused injury to plaintiff, and that 
-1-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendant University of Utah (incorrectly identified as 
University of Utah Medical Center) is vicariously liable for 
plaintiff's damages on agency principles because of its 
employer-employee relationship with Dr. Stevens at the time of 
the surgery. 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in the lower court on 
the ground that plaintiff's claim against the University had 
already been adjudicated in a separate action filed by plain-
tiff in the same court against Dr. Stevens in his individual 
capacity. The lower court, the Honorable Philip R. Fishier 
presiding, granted defendant's motion. This appeal followed. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff Ronald Cunningham underwent surgery at the 
University of Utah Hospital on January 28, 1982, following 
several weeks of observation, treatment and testing. [R. 3-4.] 
Cunningham's treating physician and surgeon was Dr. Michael H. 
Stevens. [R. 4.] At all times relevant to plaintiff's 
allegations in this action, Dr. Stevens was an employee of the 
University of Utah through its Hospital and School of 
Medicine. [R. 2.3 Plaintiff claims he did not know of 
Dr. Stevens' employment relationship with the University until 
February 5, 1984. [R. 3, 5-6.] 
Plaintiff filed this action on January 18, 1985. [R. 2.] 
Plaintiff's claims against the University are based solely on 
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its status as Dr. Steven's employer; plaintiff does not allege 
any independent acts of negligence on the part of the 
University. [Brief of Appellant, p. 6.] 
The University filed a Motion to Dismiss in response to 
plaintiff's Complaint. [R. 10-11.] The motion was based on, 
inter alia, the ground that plaintiff's claims against the 
University had previously been adjudicated by the lower court 
in a separate action filed against Dr. Stevens in his individ-
ual capacity, Third District Court Civil No. C84-286. [R. 
10.] Oral arguments on defendant's motion were heard before 
Judge Fishier on January 22, 1985, pursuant to notice. [R. 13, 
21.] 
Judge Fishier granted defendant's motion on the basis of 
the court's ruling in the prior action. [R. 22.] The Order of 
Dismissal was entered by the court on March 7, 1985. [R. 22.] 
No objection was made to the order. Plaintiff's Notice of 
Appeal was filed on April 5, 1985. [R. 25-26.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
An appellant has the affirmative burden to show, solely 
upon the record before the appellate court, that the lower 
court erred with respect to the order in question. The plain-
tiff in this case is unable to make such a showing, and the 
order of the lower court must therefore be presumed to be 
correct and valid. 
-3-
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The lower court's order should be affirmed, even if the 
Court chooses to consider plaintiff's arguments based on the 
matters presented by plaintiff which are outside the appellate 
record. Judge Fishier's order gives appropriate deference to a 
prior order of the lower court denying plaintiff leave to amend 
his Complaint to state his claim against this defendant. The 
attempted amendment was futile because plaintiff's claim is 
barred by his failure to file a timely notice of claim as 
required by the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF 
SHOWING UPON THE RECORD ON APPEAL THAT THE 
LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
An appellant has the affirmative burden of showing, upon 
the record on appeal, that the lower court erred with respect 
to the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken. 
Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499, 500 (Utah 1976); accord Hamid 
v. Sew Original, 645 P.2d 496, 497 (Okla. 1982) [Legal error is 
not presumed from a silent record]. Under Utah law, the judg-
ment of the lower court is presumed correct until this affirma-
tive burden has been met. Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 
Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410, 412-13 (1964). 
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The required demonstration of error must be made solely 
upon the appellate record. This Court has consistently 
followed the well-recognized rule of appellate review that 
matters not a part of the record on appeal need not, and indeed 
cannot, be considered in connection with the appeal. Uckerman 
v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 
1978); In re Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128, n. 1 (Utah 1978). 
This rule was recently reaffirmed by this Court's opinion in 
Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 (Utah 1983). 
Justice Oaks, for a unanimous court, wrote: 
Plaintiff does not contest these propositions, 
but maintains that the reasonableness of its fees is 
not before us on this appeal. In arguing this point, 
both parties encumber their briefs with assertions of 
facts about what went on in the hearing before the 
arbitrator for which there is no reference to the 
record and no support in the record. We ignore all 
such matters and base our decision solely upon the 
facts shown in the record. 
669 P.2d at 846. 
Utah law charges the appellant with the responsibility and 
burden of bringing before the reviewing court a record upon 
which the merit of his position can be ascertained. Bennett 
Leasing Company v. Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246 
(1963). In the absence of an appellate record sufficient to 
document the alleged trial court error, the judgment of the 
lower court is presumed valid and must be sustained. Where 
only a partial record is presented to the reviewing court, it 
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is presumed that the remaining record below supports the judg-
ment of the trial court. Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 
Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410, 413 (1964); Bennett Leasing Company 
v. Ellison, supra at 247. 
In Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 (1959), 
this Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment dismiss-
ing the plaintiff's claim for damages arising from an intersec-
tion collision. The Court wrote: 
When a summary judgment is granted against a 
party, he is entitled to have the trial court, and 
this court on review, consider all of the evidence and 
every inference fairly to be derived therefrom in the 
light most favorable to him. This rule, relied upon 
by the plaintiff, is not very helpful here because the 
only facts before us are contained in the above-
mentioned documents and the recitals in the judgment 
signed by the trial court based upon the pretrial 
conference. In the absence of any other record it 
stands unassailed as reflecting the facts presented to 
the court. If the plaintiff contends to the contrary, 
he has the burden of bringing the record here to show 
otherwise, because the burden is upon the appellant to 
show error. 
337 P.2d at 60 [footnotes omitted]. 
The order of the lower court in this case must be affirmed 
on appeal since plaintiff is unable to substantiate his claim 
of error upon the appellate record before this Court.1 
1
 Plaintiff makes one argument for reversal upon the appel-
late record, claiming error in the form of the lower court's 
order. Plaintiff argues the order is in fact a summary judg-
ment since the court took judicial notice of matters outside 
the pleadings, viz. Judge David B. Dee's order denying plain-
tiff leave to amend in his prior action against Dr. Stevens. 
(Continued) 
-6-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff encumbers his brief with statements and arguments not 
supported by the record concerning what occurred in his other 
action against Dr. Stevens, and also attempts to bring before 
this Court, through inclusion in the appendix of his brief, 
documents which are not a part of the record on appeal. These 
matters cannot be considered by the Court in deciding this 
appeal, in keeping with the authorities cited above and the 
current Rules of Appellate Procedure. See URAP, Rule 10(h) 
[record may only be corrected, modified or supplemented by 
stipulation of parties, order of district court or order of 
supreme court]. Plaintiff cannot establish on the basis of the 
appellate record that Judge Fishier*s order was not properly 
based on res judicata or that he should have reconsidered the 
merits of plaintiff's claims. [Brief of Appellant, Statement 
1
 (Continued) 
This argument is without merit. The trial court may take judi-
cial notice of its ruling in other prior or pending cases, so 
long as the parties are made aware it is doing so. Carter v. 
Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977). The parties in this 
case do not dispute that the prior order was called to Judge 
Fishier1s attention. Whether the dismissal based on that prior 
ruling was styled an order or judgment is of no effect; it is 
the substance of the document not its title which controls. 
Cf. Dunham v. Travis, 25 Utah 65, 69 P. 468 (1902) [it is facts 
set up in pleading, and not name given to it, which determines 
whether it is answer or counterclaim]. Most importantly, 
plaintiff has waived any argument over any irregularity in the 
form of the order by failing to make a timely objection before 
the lower court. 
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of Issues, p. 1.] The order of the lower court is therefore 
presumed correct and valid and should be affirmed. 
One prior decision of this Court is similar enough to the 
primary issue posed in this appeal and its attendant factual 
setting that counsel feels an ethical obligation to bring it to 
the Court's attention, even though the majority opinion is 
inconsistent with the authorities discussed above and contrary 
to defendant's position. 
In Parrish v. Layton City Corporation, 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 
1975), the Court reviewed a summary judgment granted defendant 
by the lower court on the ground that plaintiff was barred from 
recovery by the res judicata effect of a dismissal of a prior 
claim he had filed in the same court, and by his continuing 
failure to comply with the notice of claim provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 542 P.2d at 1087. 
The opinion states: 
A survey of the record reveals that defendant 
never submitted a copy of the pleadings and judgment 
in Civil No.17649 to the trial court, either in its 
pleadings or in company with its motion for summary 
judgment. The mere fact that there was a record of 
another action on file in the clerk's office did not 
place these records in evidence. Rule 68(1) and (3) 
U.R.E., and Rule 44(a) and (d) U.R.C.P., provide the 
methods by which a judicial record may be proved. 
Since the record of the prior action was not before 
the trial court, there is no basis to sustain the 
determination that plaintiff's claim was barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
542 P.2d at 1087 [footnotes omitted]. 
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The Parrish Court's analysis is inconsistent with the other 
decisions of this Court discussed above upholding the principle 
that the appellant must demonstrate on the basis of the appel-
late record that the lower court erred; the burden is not upon 
the respondent to prove the lower court acted correctly, rather 
that is presumed. 
The dissenting opinion in Parrish, authored by Justice 
Ellett and concurred in by Justice Crockett, is consistent with 
this Court's other pronouncements and states the better rule: 
I dissent from the holding that the trial court 
could not find res judicata. The main opinion says, 
"A survey of the record reveals that defendant never 
submitted a copy of the pleadings and judgment in 
Civil No. 17649 to the trial court." 
The true statement should be that the record does 
not show that the files in Civil No. 17649 were not 
before the trial court. There is no transcript before 
us, and it is mere speculation to say that counsel did 
not hand file No. 17649 to the judge and say, "Will 
Your Honor take judicial notice of papers in this 
file?" 
We presume the judge acted properly and based his 
ruling on credible evidence. One who attacks the 
judgment of the Trial Court has the burden of showing 
error, and when the transcript of a proceeding in 
court is not brought before us, we cannot speculate 
that perhaps there was no proper evidence to sustain 
the ruling made. 
542 P.2d at 1089 [footnote omitted]. 
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POINT II 
THIS APPEAL IS AN ATTEMPT BY PLAINTIFF TO 
CIRCUMVENT THE PRIOR RULINGS OF BOTH THIS 
COURT AND THE LOWER COURT. THE LOWER 
COURT'S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED SINCE IT 
GAVE PROPER DEFERENCE TO A PRIOR CORRECT 
RULING OF THE SAME COURT. 
This appeal, like the filing of this action in the lower 
court, is an overt attempt by plaintiff to circumvent the 
effect of Judge David B. Dee's prior order denying plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend his complaint in the prior action against 
Dr. Stevens.2 This defendant does not approve of plaintiff's 
attempt to seek a review of Judge Dee's order by introducing 
matters for this Court's consideration which are beyond the 
appellate record. Should the Court choose to address plain-
tiff's arguments, however, and thereby review both Judge 
Fishier's order and Judge Dee's prior order, the following 
argument is offered. 
A. Supporting Facts. 
Plaintiff's allegations in this action are identical to the 
allegations he sought to assert against the University of Utah 
by way of amendment in his prior action against Dr. Stevens. 
Plaintiff does not allege he was injured by any independent act 
2
 This Court has previously denied plaintiff's petition for 
an intermediate appeal of Judge Dee's order. Ronald Cunningham 
v. Michael H. Stevens, M.D., Supreme Court No. 20443 (March 20, 
1985). 
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of negligence on the part of the University. He claims only 
that the University is vicariously liable to him for the negli-
gence of its employee, Dr. Michael H. Stevens ("Dr. Stevens"). 
At all times relevant to plaintiff's allegations, 
Dr. Stevens was an employee of the University of Utah School of 
Medicine. He officed at the University of Utah and limited his 
practice to the University of Utah School of Medicine and 
Hospital. The care and treatment Dr. Stevens rendered to 
plaintiff was performed in his capacity as an employee of the 
University of Utah. Addendum, pp. 1-4. 
Plaintiff became aware of the facts giving rise to his 
claim against Dr. Stevens soon after the January 28, 1982, 
surgery. Addendum, pp. 5-6. Plaintiff served Dr. Stevens with 
a Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action on June 9, 1983, in 
care of the University of Utah Hospital. Addendum, p. 7. The 
Notice of Intent was later amended by supplemental notices. 
Plaintiff commenced an action against Dr. Stevens in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Civil No. 
C84-286, on January 19, 1984. Counsel for Dr. Stevens filed a 
Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Dr. Stevens was at all 
times an employee of the University of Utah and was therefore 
entitled to the protection of the provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. 
(1977). On the basis of that motion, plaintiff filed an 
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Amended Complaint in March 1984, changing his claim against 
Dr. Stevens from an allegation of ordinary negligence to an 
allegation of gross negligence in an effort to comply with the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Plaintiff 
then served the State Attorney General's Office with a Notice 
of Intent to Commence Legal Action against the University of 
Utah Medical Center on March 7, 1984. An Amended Notice of 
Intent dated July 30, 1984, was served on the Attorney 
General's Office on August 2, 1984, and on the University of 
Utah Hospital on August 6, 1984. 
In November 1984, plaintiff again moved to amend his 
Complaint against Dr. Stevens to join the University of Utah 
Medical Center as a defendant. Plaintiff's proposed amendment 
stated the identical claim asserted in this action. Addendum, 
pp. 8-20. Plaintiff's motion was briefed, and then argued 
before Judge David B. Dee on December 14, 1984. Counsel for 
the University of Utah and Dr. Stevens indicated to the Court 
that they had no procedural objection to plaintiff amending his 
Complaint, but that the University would thereafter file a 
Motion to Dismiss based on plaintiff's failure to comply with 
the notice of claim requirement of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. In the interest of judicial economy, Judge Dee 
heard argument on the University's defense. After taking the 
matter under advisement Judge Dee denied plaintiff's Motion to 
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Amend on the basis that the amendment was futile since the 
claims plaintiff sought to assert were barred by his failure to 
serve a timely notice of claim as required by the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act. Addendum, pp. 21-22. 
Following the entry of Judge Dee's order, plaintiff filed 
this action in an overt attempt to circumvent the effect of 
Judge Dee's ruling by having the "new case" heard by a differ-
ent judge. The case was assigned to Judge Fishier, who saw 
through plaintiff's ruse and dismissed the "new case" on the 
basis of Judge Dee's prior ruling. Judge Fishier did not 
attempt to address the merits of plaintiff's claims or defen-
dant's notice of claim defense since Judge Dee had already done 
so. 
B. Res Judicata. 
Judge Dee's ruling was a final determination on the merits 
as to all issues pertaining to plaintiff's claim against this 
defendant. It is a final judgment as to this defendant, even 
though the order is interlocutory in nature because of the 
remaining claim against Dr. Stevens. It therefore falls within 
the spirit of the principle of res judicata and Judge Fishier's 
order to that effect is a correct ruling. See Searle Bros, v. 
Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978) [res judicata precludes 
relitigation of same cause of action between same parties]. 
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The lower court's order should be affirmed whether or not 
this Court finds that the situation presented fits the techni-
cal requirements for application of res judicata. Under the 
rules of appellate review, this Court will affirm the trial 
court on any proper ground even if the trial court assigned an 
incorrect reason for its ruling. Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 
595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979). Judge Fishier's order should be 
affirmed since it accorded proper deference to the prior ruling 
of Judge Dee.3 Judge Dee properly denied plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend finding that the claim plaintiff wished to assert was 
subject to dismissal because of plaintiff's failure to comply 
with the notice of claim provision of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12, and the amendment was 
therefore futile. 
C. Futility of Amendment. 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and cases 
decided thereunder, do state, as plaintiff argues, that leave 
to amend shall be freely given in the interest of justice. The 
trial court is granted wide discretion in determining whether 
amendment should be allowed. Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 
3
 Repeated application for an order or the same relief is 
statutorily prohibited, Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-19 (1977), and 
may under some circumstances even constitute a contempt of 
court. Hammer v. Gibbons and Reed Company, 29 Utah 2d 415, 510 
P.2d 1104, 1005 (1973). 
i 
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165, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971) [cited in Brief of Appellant at 
p. 8]. The requirement that leave to amend be freely given is 
not applicable, however, when the complaint, as amended, is 
subject to dismissal. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 630 F.2d 1383, 1389 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) [while Rule 15(a) requires 
that leave to amend be freely given, this requirement is not 
applicable when the Complaint, as amended, would be subject to 
dismissal]). 
A similar situation was presented to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Evans v. United 
States Veterans Admin. Hospital, 391 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1968). 
In that case the plaintiff filed a negligence action against 
the Veteran's Administration Hospital. Plaintiff later sought 
to add the United States as a party under the provisions of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
dismissal of the lower court as to the hospital and further 
stated: 
Furthermore, plaintiff is foreclosed from amending her 
complaint to add the United States as a party and 
thereafter proceeding under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, since the two year period of limitations under 
the federal statute has already run. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2401. Finally, Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure which allows a claimant to amend a 
Complaint to add a party and still have the amendment 
relate back to the date of the original pleading, is 
inapplicable here. In the instant case no notice of 
the pendency of the claim was given to the United 
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States within the limitations period of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act. [Footnotes omitted]. 
391 F.2d at 262. 
If Judge Dee's determination that plaintiffs claim against 
the University was barred by his failure to comply with the 
notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act is correct, plaintiff's amendment was futile under the 
cited authorities and Judge Dee acted correctly in denying 
plaintiff leave to amend. 
D. Notice of Claim Defense. 
A review of the merits of Judge Dee's ruling on the 
University's notice of claim defense shows clearly that 
plaintiff's claim is barred as a matter of law and does not 
warrant remand to the lower court for further consideration. 
Under Utah law, the timely filing of a notice of claim is a 
condition precedent to maintaining an action against the state 
or its employee. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-1 et seer. (1977) provides: 
A claim against the state or its employee for an act 
or omission occurring during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color 
of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the Attorney General and the agency 
concerned within one year after the claim arises. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1977).4 
4
 As used in this Act, "the state" includes any hospital, 
college or university of the state. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-2(1) (1977). 
-16-
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A claim is deemed to arise for purposes of § 63-30-12, 
"when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim 
were against a private person begins to run," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-11(1) (1977). Since this is an action for medical 
malpractice, the applicable statute of limitations is that 
contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-1 et seq. (1977). 
Section 78-14-4 of the Health Care Malpractice Act provides 
that the limitations period for filing a medical malpractice 
action commences to run when the plaintiff discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, 
the injury. The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this provi-
sion to mean that the limitations period begins to run when the 
plaintiff or patient discovers or should have discovered that 
he has sustained an injury and that the injury may have been 
possibly caused by the negligence of the health care provider. 
Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). 
In this case plaintiff admits that he was aware of the 
facts giving rise to his claim against Dr. Stevens "soon after 
January 27, 1982." Addendum, pp. 5-6. Since plaintiffs claim 
against the University of Utah Medical Center is based solely 
on its status as Dr. Stevens' employer, plaintiff discovered 
his "legal injury" against the University at that same time. 
He then had one year, or until approximately January 27, 1983, 
-17-
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to file the appropriate notice of claim with the Attorney 
General's Office and the University of Utah Hospital. Plain-
tiff did not comply with the notice of claim requirement, 
however, until August 1984, more than one and a half years too 
late. His claim as to the University of Utah Medical Center 
and Hospital is therefore barred as a matter of law, as the 
lower court properly found. Yates v. Vernal Family Health 
Center, 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980). 
Contrary to plaintiffs argument, the running of the 
statute of limitations upon his claim against the University of 
Utah does not turn upon when he "discovered" the employment 
relationship between the University and Dr. Stevens. The "dis-
covery of legal injury" concept adopted in Foil v. Ballinger, 
supra, does not impact on issues of agency and employment. 
Foil does not hold that a legal injury is discovered only when 
a patient knows the identity of all persons or entities 
involved in his care and the relationship between those persons 
or entities. Indeed, such a holding would not be consistent 
with the Court's reasoning. The Foil court adopted the "legal 
injury" concept because of the unique nature of medical mal-
practice cases and the great disparity in knowledge of medical 
procedures between patients and doctors. That same uniqueness 
and disparity of knowledge do not exist in matters respecting 
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identification of parties and agency relationships. Informa-
tion about a prospective defendant's employment is as easily 
obtainable by an injured automobile driver. Foil therefore 
does not excuse plaintiff's failure to file a timely notice of 
claim. 
None of plaintiff's authorities are to the contrary. None 
of the cased cited by plaintiff deal with principles of 
agency. None of them suggest that the running of the statute 
of limitations as to an employer should await the discovery by 
the plaintiff of the fact of the defendant's employment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully asks 
that the judgment of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's 
Complaint and action be affirmed. 
DATED this / " day of October, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By G%yt**fS)(/. 
Merlin *R. Lybbert 
Bruce H. Jensen 
Attorneys for Respondent 
SCM1491U 
W^^ — 
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MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU ' 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD CUNNINGHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M.D. , 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MICHAEL H. STEVENS, Upon being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. That he is the defendant named in the above-entitled 
action. 
2. That at all times mentioned in plaintiff's Complaint 
he was an employee of the University of Utah School of Medicine, 
with the rank of Associate Professor of Surgery. 
3. That at all times mentioned in plaintiff's Complaint 
the treatment and care rendered to plaintiff was done in his 
capacity as an employee of the University of Utah and during 
the performance of his duties and within the scope of his em-
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL 
H. STEVENS, M.D. 
Civil No. C84-286 
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ployment, as aforesaid. 
±L 
~* Michael H. Stevens, M.D 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this &< day o 
1984. (&P S/^tfj/rpsMl M.\3*>yttSL 
Notary Public
 n V. 
Residing at ^J/T ^MxA. 
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MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU i 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD CUNNINGHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M.D., 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
G. RICHARD LEE, M.D., upon being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. That since the i
 Ri- day of March , 19 78 » he 
has been the Dean of the University of Utah School of Medicine, 
with the rank of Professor, and as such is familiar with the 
status and terms of employment of physicians at the University. 
2. Beginning prior to the 29th day of December, 1981, 
m 
Michael H. Stevens, M.D., was employed as an Associate Professor 
of Surgery in the School of Medicine by the University of Utah. 
3. That in connection with the services of Dr. Michael H. 
Stevens at the University of Utah, whether rendered in his capacity 
AFFIDAVIT OF G. RICHARD 
LEE, M.D. 
Civil No. CB4-2B6 
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as a teacher of medical principles and procedures or in connec- . 
tion with the care and treatment of patients, such activities are 
i 
carried out as a part of his duties as an employee of the Univer-
sity of Utah School of Medicine and within the scope of his em-
ployment. 
4. That his treatment and care of Ronald Cunningham com-
mencing on or about December 29, 1981, were undertaken and ren-
dered in his capacity as an employee of the University of Utah 
Hospital and within the scope of that employment. 
§/ 
G. Richard Lee, M.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this SAJL day of 
, 1984. 
My Commission Expires: 
/a-t-ff^ 
Notar^Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
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JOSEPH S. KNOV7LTON 
Attorney at Law 
845 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
H a RONALD CUNNINGHAM, 
12 I Plaintiff, 
13 ' vs-
14 jj MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M.D., 
15 1 Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORI-
TIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C84-286 
(Judge David B. Dee) 
16 
17 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Plaintiff respectfully submits the following Memorandum of 
18 I Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion to Amend Complaint 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(a) A party jr.ay amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, 
he may so amend it at any time within twenty days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend 
his pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires. . . . 
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1 
2 
3 
4
. | 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
provides that a claim against the State is deemed to arise when 
the Statute of Limitations would otherwise commence against a 
private person. Section 63-30-14 states that a Notice of Claim 
must be filed within one year after the claim arises. 
^ Plaintiff suffered severe physical injury on the 27th day 
of January, 1982. Beginning soon after that date. Plaintiff was 
informed and aware of facts giving rise to his claim against Dr. 
Stevens. However, despite reasonable diligence exerted, Plaintiff 
was not informed of his legal injury as caused by the University 
of Utah Medical Center until the 7th day of February, 1984. This 
lack of knowledge was at least partially caused by Dr. Stevens1 
failure to inform Plaintiff of his agency and employment relation-
ship. In any event, Plaintiff did not through reasonable diligence! 
Ij 
12 «, discover his "legal injury" until more than two years after the 
li 
ii 
13 !: actual misconduct. 
14 In Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 Utah (1979), the 
i! 
15 Utah State Supreme Court declared that the Statute of Limitations i 
I: 
16 j; commences on a medical malpractice claim only upon the discovery • 
i 
7 I of the "legal injury." The Utah Court cited and agre d with the
18 : Oregon Supreme Court in Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 998 Or. 
,n S 
19 (1966): 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
To say that a cause of action accrues to a 
person when she may maintain an action thereon 
and, at the same time, that it accrues before i 
she has or can reasonably be expected to have 
knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon her is 
patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She 
cannot maintain an action before she knows
 ( 
she has one. 
! ( 
ji - 4 -
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J O S E P H S. KNOWLTON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
6 4 6 EAST AOO SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH S 4 I 0 2 
May 26, 1983 
Or. Michael Stevens 
c/o University Hospital 
50 Medical Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84132 
3^96 Mill Hollow Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Dr. Stevens: 
I have been retained to represent Mr. Ronald Cunningham and his family 
in regard to surgery that you performed upon Mr. Cunningham on or about 
the 27th day of January, 1982. The surgery had been represented to Mr. 
Cunningham and his family as being a minor procedure and developed into 
a very serious procedure, beyond your capacity to handle in your specialty, 
even though you proceeded to attempt to remedy the situation which, my 
client feels, was negligent on your part and, as you know, the results 
were disastrous. 
The surgery took place in the University Hospital under your direction 
and was conducted without Mr. Cunningham and his family having given 
an informed consent as neither Mr. Cunningham nor his family nor, we 
allege, you knew of the magnitude of the tumor prior to the commencement 
of the surgery, which lack of knowledge on your part led to the procedures 
about which he and his family are complaining. 
This letter is being sent to you in order to meet the requirements of 
Section 78-U-8 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 As Amended. 
: / < / / ' • ' < • • • * * -
Joseph S. Know! ton 
TELEPHONE 
6 6 5 - 5 1 0 1 
AREA CODE SOI 
yVrt? DATE SERVED . 
AT RESIDENCE _ 
UPON ^ S n 1 " 1 * * - V b * i « * 
SlNDJXQnstati'e Murray Precmci 
iouflly. Stale of Uter. 
Deputy 
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JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON 
Attorney at Law 
845 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
»'-„ K !'l - • i »?,» 
CAn^^Tt 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD CUNNINGHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M.D., 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
AMEND COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C84-286 
(Judge David B. Dee) 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, through counsel, and pursuant to 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully 
moves the Court for an Order allowing Plaintiff to Amend his 
Complaint adding the University of Utah Medical Center as a 
party Defendant and asserting causes of action against said 
Defendant as set forth in Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended 
Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
This Motion is supported by the Affidavits of Ronald 
Cunningham and Joan Cunningham dated March 28, 1984, and the 
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Affidavits of Michael H. Stevens, M.D. and G. Richard Lee, M.D., 
dated February 2 and 3, 1984, respectively, all OB file herein. 
It is further supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
filed together herewith. 
DATED this /) day of November, 1984. 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT to Merlin 
R. Lybbert, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Attorneys for Defen-
dant, Michael H. Stevens, M.D., 10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor, 
P. O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, and State of Utah, 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid, on the /J c "^day of November, 
1984. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON 
Attorney at Lav; 
845 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD CUNNINGHAM, : 
. : PROPOSED 
Plaintiff, . :. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
ys. : • 
MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M.D., and : Civil No. C84-286 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL : (Judge David B. Dee) 
CENTER, : 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiff complains of Defendants and alleges: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Ronald Cunningham \cas a patient at University 
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, under the care and control of 
Defendants Michael H. Stevens and University of Utah Medical 
Center, beginning January 27, 1982, v;hen he suffered sericcs 
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injuries by the wrongful acts and conduct of said Defendants as 
hereinafter set forth. 
r 
2. Defendant, Michael H. Stevens, M.D. is, and at all 
times material hereto was, a physician licensed to practice and 
practicing medicine in the State of Utah as a health care 
provider as defined in Section 78-14-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
3. On the 9th day of June, 1983, a Notice of Intent to 
Commence Legal Action in letter form was served on Defendant 
Stevens pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-14-8, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. Said Notice was amended and 
supplemented by letters dated August 1, 1983 and December 28, 
1983, both of which were duly served upon said Defendant. 
4. Plaintiff has received no response from said Defendant 
to said Notices. 
5. Defendant, University of Utah Medical Center is, and 
at all times material hereto was, a licensed health care provider 
as defined in Section 78-14-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended and the employer of Defendant, Michael H. Stevens, M.D. 
6. On or about the 5th day of February, Plaintiff first 
received notice of Defendants employment and agent relationship 
with Defendant Medical Center through an Affidavit filed in 
support of a Motion to Dismiss. 
7. On the 7th day of March, 1984, a Notice of Intent to 
Commence Legal Action was served upon the Attorney General for 
the State of Utah and on the 30th day of July, 1984, a similar 
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Notice was served upon the Defendant Medical Center pursuant to I 
Section 78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
8. Plaintiff has received no response from said Defendant 
to said Notice. 
COUNT I 
(Negligence) 
9. Beginning the 29th day of December, 1981, Defendants 
undertook to provide and maintain surgical and medical care and 
treatment for Plaintiff. 
10. Beginning the 29th day of December, 1981, while the 
Plaintiff was a patient at the University Hospital under the 
treatment and care of Defendants, Defendant Medical Center, 
through its agent and employee Defendant Stevens, wrongfully, 
negligently and carelessly failed to provide and maintain proper 
and adequate medical and surgical diagnosis, treatment, services | 
l 
and care for him. J 
11. At the time of the wrongful, negligent and careless act 
and omissions of the Defendant Medical Center through its agent 
and employee Defendant Stevens, the care, treatment and services 
provided to Plaintiff, including the instrumentalities employed 
therein, were under the exclusive supervision, control and < 
management of said Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not 
contribute to his injury, the occurrence of which was more 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 probably than not the proximate result of the negligence of said 
2 Defendant, its agent and employee, Defendant Stevens. 
3 12. As a proximate result of the negligent acts and omission 
4 of the Defendant, Medical Center through its agent and employee 
5 Defendant Stevens, following the surgery first performed by 
6 Defendant Stevens on the 28th day of January, 1982, Plaintiff was 
7 rendered temporarily comatose, suffered permanent loss of most of 
8 his basic voluntary physical functions, and sustained mental and 
9 emotional injury from all of which he has suffered severe and 
10 excruciating pain, discomfort and disability, and from which he 
11 will continue to suffer pain, discomfort, and permanent disability 
12 all to his general damage in a reasonable sum. 
13 13. As a further consequence to the negligent acts and 
14 omissions of Defendant Medical Center through its agent and 
15 employee Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff's initial hospitalization 
16 was greatly prolonged, and he has been required to seek additional 
17 medical treatment, has been required to employ the services of 
18 doctors, nurses, therapists and other medical personnel for 
19 medical care and treatment, and has incurred hospital, doctor, am 
20 I other medical expenses in the approximate amount of $100,000.00, 
and will be required in the future to incur expenses for medical 
care and treatment all to his special damage. 
14. At the time of his injuries, Plaintiff was 54 years of 
age, in good physical condition and was gainfully employed in 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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producing economic benefits which he contributed to the support of 
his family; he was in good health/ intelligent, and a source of 
joy, companionship, happiness, support, and care of his family. 
15. As a further consequence to the negligent acts and 
omissions of Defendant Medical Center through its agent and 
employee Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff has suffered a complete loss 
of earning capacity and ability to provide sustenance and support 
for his family together with an extreme degree of impairment of 
his ability to enjoy the society and companionship of his family. 
16. The pain, discomfort, and permanent disability which 
Plaintiff has sustained would not have resulted or occurred if 
Defendant Medical Center through its agent and employee Defendant 
Stevens, had not been negligent in the care, treatment and 
services administered to him, as aforesaid. 
17. Plaintiff did not discover and could not, through the 
use of reasonable diligence have discovered his legal injury 
caused by Defendant Medical Center until after the 5th day of 
February, 1984, the day Plaintiff was first given notice of 
Defendant Stevens1 employment and agency with Defendant Medical 
Center. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment as hereinafter set 
forth. 
COUNT II 
(Lack Of Informed Consent) 
18. Plaintiff adopts, and by this reference, incorporates 
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herein, the allegations set forth in Paragraphs numbered 5 through 
i 
17 of Count I hereof 
19. On or about the 28th day of January, 1982, and there-
after, Defendant Medical Center through its agent and employee 
Defendant Stevens, subjected, or caused Plaintiff to be subjected, 
ft I  to certain procedures and other medical care and treatment 
7 I 20. Prio rto and at the time of said procedures, medical 
8 || care and treatment, Defendants failed to inform Plaintiff of the 
Q J] potential hazards or dangers incident thereto. 
1Q I 21. Plaintiff did not give his informed consent to the 
11 J) particular procedures recommended and would not have consented had 
the dangers and hazards thereof been made known to him. 
22. As a direct and proximate result of the unauthorized 
procedures, care and treatment by Defendant Medical Center through 
jc [I its agent and employee Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff was rendered 
jg temporarily comatose, suffered permanent loss of most of his basic 
yj voluntary physical functions, and sustained mental and 
jg emotional injury from all of which he has suffered severe and 
19 excruciating pain, discomfort and disability, and from which he 
20 will continue to suffer pain, discomfort, and permanent disability 
2i all to his general damage in a reasonable sum. 
22 23. As a further direct consequence of the unauthorized 
23 I procedures, care, and treatment by Defendant Medical Center 
24 through its agent and employee, Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff's 
12 
13 
14 
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j initial hospitalization was greatly prolonged, and he has been 
2 required to seek additional medical treatment, has been requested 
o to employ the services of doctors, nurses, therapists and other 
4 medical personnel for medical care and treatment, and has incurred 
g hospital, doctor, and other medical expenses in the approximate 
g amount of $100,000.00 and will be required in the future to incur 
7 expenses for medical care and treatment all to his special damage, 
g 24. At the time of his injuries, Plaintiff was 54 years of 
Q age, in good physical condition and was gainfully employed in 
2Q producing economic benefits which he contributed to the support of 
H his family; he was in good health, intelligent and a source of 
12 J°Y' companionship, happiness, support, and care for his family. 
jo 25. As a further direct consequence of the unauthorized 
j4 procedures, care and treatment by Defendant Medical Center through 
15 its agent and employee Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff has suffered 
15 a complete loss of earning capacity and ability to provide 
17 sustenance and support for his family together with an extreme 
18 degree of impairment of his ability to enjoy the society and 
19 companionship of his family. 
20 26. The pain, discomfort, and permanent disability which 
21 Plaintiff has sustained would not have resulted or occurred if 
22 Defendants had not been negligent in the care, treatment and 
23 services administered to him, as aforesaid. 
24 27. Plaintiff did not discover and could not, through the 
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1 use of reasonable diligence have discovered his legal injury 
II r 
2 caused by Defendant Medical Center until after the 5th day of 
3 February, 1984, the day Plaintiff was first given notice of 
4 Defendant Stevens1 employment and agency with Defendant Medical 
5 Center. 
6 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment as hereinafter set 
7 forth. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
COUNT III 
(Gross Negligence) 
28. Plaintiff adopts, and by this reference, incorporates 
herein, the allegations set forth in Paragraphs numbered 5 through 
27 of Counts I and II hereof. 
29. Beginning the 29th day of December, 1981, Defendant 
Stevens undertook to provide and maintain surgical and medical 
care and treatment for Plaintiff. 
30. Beginning the 29th day of December, 1981, while the 
Plaintiff was a patient at the University Hospital under the 
treatment and care of Defendant Stevens, said Defendant wrongfull 
and carelessly failed to provide and maintain proper and adequate 
medical and surgical diagnosis, treatment, services and care for 
him, which failure was grossly negligent in the circumstances. 
31. At the time of the wrongful, grossly negligent and 
careless acts and omissions of Defendant Stevens, the care, 
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1 treatment and services provided to Plaintiff, including the 
2 instrumentalities employed therein, were under the exclusive 
3 supervision, control and management of said Defendant. Further-
4 more, Plaintiff did not contribute to his injury, the occurrence 
5 of which was more probably than not the proximate result of the 
6 gross negligence of Defendant Stevens. 
7 32. As a proximate result of the grossly negligent acts and 
8 omissions of Defendant Stevens, following the surgery first 
9 performed by said Defendant on the 28th day of January, 1982, 
10 Plaintiff was rendered temporarily comatose, suffered permanent 
11 loss of most of his basic voluntary physical functions, and 
12 sustained mental and emotional injury from all of which he has 
13 suffered severe and excruciating pain, discomfort and disability, 
14 and from which he will continue to suffer pain, discomfort, and 
15 permanent disability all to his general damage in a reasonable sum.'< 
16 33. As a further consequence to the grossly negligent acts 
17 and omissions of Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff's initial 
18 hospitalization was greatly prolonged, and he has been required to < 
19 employ the services of doctors, nurses, therapists and other 
20 j medical personnel for medical care and treatment, and has incurred 
21 hospital, doctor, and other medical expenses in the approximate i 
22 amount of $100,000.00, and will be required in the future to incur 
23 I expenses for medical care and treatment all to his special 
damage. • 24 
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1 34. At the time of his injuries, Plaintiff was 54 years og 
i 
n age, in good physical condition and was gainfully employed in 
o producing economic benefits which he contributed to the support of 
4 his family; he was in good health, intelligent, and a source of 
c joy/ companionship, happiness, support, and care of his family. 
fi 35. As a further consequence to the grossly negligent acts 
7 and omissions of Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff has suffered a 
o complete loss of earning capacity and ability to provide sustenanc 
o and support for his family together with an extreme degree of 
JQ impairment of his ability to enjoy the society and companionship 
H of his family. 
12 36. The pain, discomfort, and permanent disability which 
13 Plaintiff has sustained would not have resulted or occurred if 
j4 Defendant Stevens had not been grossly negligent in the care, 
15 treatment and services administered to him, as aforesaid. 
16 37. Plaintiff did not discover and could not, through the 
YJ use of reasonable diligence have discovered his legal injury cause 
18 by Defendant Stevens until after the 28th day of January, 1982, 
19 the day of the first surgery performed on him by said Defendant. 
20 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants 
2i jointly and severally, as hereinafter set forth: 
22 1* F o r a reasonable sum for general damages; 
23 2. For the sum of $100,000.00 special damages for medical 
24 expenses incurred, together with such other and further sums of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
medical-related expenses as Plaintiff may incur by -the time of 
trial and shall reasonably incur thereafter; l-
3. For a reasonable sum for lost earnings to date of trial 
and for loss of earning capacity incurred by Plaintiff; and 
4. For Plaintiff's costs incurred herein and for such other 
and further relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable in 
the premises. 
DATED this _ ^ day of , 1984. 
Plaintiff's Address: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
9 W8S JAN 
tt. Court 
^•qgRgjmafng 
B y
 ~J Dep'»wClern MERLIN R. LYBBERT - A2029 
DAVID G. WILLIAMS - A3481 
BRUCE H. JENSEN - A1667 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 Jfc 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD CUNNINGHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M.D., 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C-84-286 
Judge David B. Dee 
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint and 
join the University of Utah Medical Center as a party defendant 
having come on regularly for hearing before the Court on 
December 14, 1984, at 10:00 a.m., and plaintiff and defendant 
having been represented at said hearing by counsel and the 
University of Utah Medical Center having appeared specially 
through counsel, and the Court having heard arguments from counsel, 
and having reviewed memoranda submitted by the parties, and having 
found and concluded that the claims alleged by plaintiff against the 
University of Utah Medical Center as set forth in plaintiff's 
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r 
proposed Second Amended Complaint, attached as Exhibit "A" to 
plaintiff's Motion to Amended Complaint, are barred by the 
Notice of Claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend Complaint to join the University of Utah Medical 
Center as a party defendant is hereby denied. 
DATED this ^p day of J*j^£ , 19^£*T 
District Lfudge 
< 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent to the following on the / - day of October, 1985. 
T. Richard Davis 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Joseph S. Knowlton 
845 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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